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In April of 1963 from a jail cell in Birmingham, Alabama, Martin Luther King Jr. 
famously wrote a letter that states, “We who engage in nonviolent direct action are not the 
creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive” 
(73). King was jailed for leading a demonstration in Birmingham, disregarding a state circuit 
court-filed injunction against protests. The demonstration itself served as a nonviolent 
direct action in response to the racial injustice occurring in Birmingham. King wrote that 
the demonstrators “would present our very bodies as a means of laying our case before the 
conscience of the local and the national community” (66). In his letter, King sought to respond 
to those who criticized his methods of fighting racism and oppression; he justifies the use of 
civil disobedience by citing the words of historical figures, condensing a relevant argument 
by Thomas Aquinas down to a sentence: “To put it in the terms of St. Thomas Aquinas: An 
unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal law and natural law” (70). If a reader 
does not have a background in Aquinas, this sentence might read as philosophically technical 
and perhaps even as meaningless. However, Aquinas’ theory fully justifies King’s actions, and 
provides a strong moral foundation for civil disobedience.
 This essay seeks to critically consider the justification for and application of civil 
disobedience through a Thomistic lens; that is, I will use Thomas Aquinas’ work to evaluate 
whether our modern concept of civil disobedience is justified and when such action is 
just. It is my intent to identify the set of conditions under which Aquinas would support 
civil disobedience. Namely, I will posit that Aquinas would support such action under the 
conditions that the action purposefully adheres to natural law for the sake of a higher morality, 
and that it is a nonviolent act with a direct relationship to the aspect of the law that is unjust. 
Ultimately, I will claim that based on Aquinas’ established theory of law, an individual is 
in fact morally obligated to engage in civil disobedience. The paper has five parts. In section 
one I will examine the concept of civil disobedience as described by several contemporary 
philosophers. These descriptions will provide the foundation for my usage of the term “civil 
disobedience” as I move forward. In the second section I will present Aquinas’ theory of law 
and give a detailed account of the aspects of his theory that are relevant to my argument for 
obligatory civil disobedience. In section three I will consider how Aquinas’ work aligns with 
a modern conception of civil disobedience and how it can be seen as historical groundwork 
for such a concept. How do we know when to enact civil disobedience? This section applies 
the framework for civil disobedience that I have noted in Aquinas’ work to two contemporary 
examples where there was perceived injustice. In the fourth section I will investigate the 
aims of modern civil disobedience, such as policy change and pure action. The fifth and final 
section will consider a real-world argument for obligatory civil disobedience made during 
the Nuremberg trials, and ultimately conclude whether Aquinas would have supported this 
argument.
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Modern Civil Disobedience 
Before we can ask whether Thomas Aquinas would support modern civil disobedience, we 
must define the act by considering its causes and consequences. What are the most significant 
aspects of civil disobedience? Two clear positions emerge, one fixating on the initial motivation 
for the act and the other on the concrete goals of the act. The term “civil disobedience” is also 
widely and often improperly applied. This is a sticking point in the debate of what actions can 
be considered civil disobedience: should the term be defined by its common use, or should the 
term only be used when a situation satisfies a strict definition? 
For this reason, I will rely on the near consensus of several philosophers to establish 
my functional definition of civil disobedience. Political philosopher Rex Martin defines civil 
disobedience as “the deliberate and public violation of the command of an authorized and 
accepted political superior on the ground that this decree is unjust, immoral, unconstitutional, 
contrary to good public policy, etc.” (126). Similarly, moral and political philosopher John 
Rawls defines civil disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act, 
contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies 
of the government” (320). These definitions can be used jointly to define civil disobedience 
as an act that is a deliberate violation of a standard. The deliberate nature of the act seems to 
be a necessary condition. Lawyer Earl F. Morris excludes one of the most historically famous 
examples cited as civil disobedience for this reason: he claims that Rosa Parks’ refusal to give 
up her bus seat for a white man is not civil disobedience because she was not actively rejecting 
moral injustice, but because she was tired and her feet hurt (654). Purposeful action, then, is a 
necessary element.
Both definitions require that civil disobedience be public because private violation 
of the law is not always apparent to others and does not truly show moral conviction. 
Additionally, private violation of the law will likely spur no change. This is the point where 
the definitions diverge. While Martin posits why one would engage in civil disobedience in 
the first place, Rawls specifies an end goal to implement policy change. Martin’s rationale for 
civil disobedience is nearly lifted straight from Aquinas: the decree being violated is unjust, 
immoral, or unconstitutional. Interestingly, Martin also includes the aspect that a decree can be 
violated on the grounds of being contrary to good public policy. From these two definitions, I 
will adopt that civil disobedience is a deliberate, nonviolent act directly resisting or violating a 
legally sanctioned or enforced injustice.
Aquinas’ Theory of Law 
Aquinas’ potential justification of civil disobedience is rooted in his theory of law. He 
maintains that there are four types of law: eternal, divine, natural, and human. The distinction 
between natural law and human law is where conflict arises and civil disobedience becomes 
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relevant. Eternal law is the unchanging moral law that Aquinas also holds is the law of God. 
Aquinas believes that “the received is in the receiver according to the mode of the receiver” 
(On Human Nature 136). That is, a being can only receive knowledge in a way and form that 
is suited to their own form of being. Therefore, humans cannot know God’s law as God does, 
given that humans and God are fundamentally different types of beings. Aquinas posits, 
“There are two ways in which a thing can be known,” either “in itself” or “in its effect” (Summa 
Theologiae I-II Q. 93 A. 2). Humans know eternal law in this second way. He states, “No one 
except the blessed in heaven . . . can know the eternal law as it is in itself. However, every 
rational creature knows the eternal law with respect to more or less what radiates from it” (ST 
I-II Q. 93 A. 2). By this, Aquinas means that humans cannot know eternal law in its essential 
form, but only through its derivatives and effects. This phenomenon is what gives rise to 
natural law, which is the rational human participation in eternal law; it is the law we arrive at 
via reason and adhere to on moral grounds. Yet neither of these laws are as readily apparent 
as human law created by the legislature, or divine law commanded by scripture or holy texts; 
they are not universal as eternal or natural law are. Indeed, it is obvious that there are different 
human laws and divine laws practiced and enforced around the world, as countries maintain 
their own governments and legal systems and religions feature differing holy texts. Human 
and divine laws are more accessible than eternal and natural law, as they are in all likelihood 
codified and therefore widely acknowledged. 
  While humans cannot know eternal law, natural law is supposedly our rational 
participation in eternal law. How are we to know natural law? Aquinas asserts, “The first 
precept of law is that good ought to be done and pursued and that evil ought to be avoided” 
(ST I-II Q. 94 A. 2). This provides the foundation for all other precepts, which are the “practical 
precepts” or the general rules by which we might govern our practical actions. Aquinas 
describes humans as rational living substances who have multiple inclinations, or tendencies 
to an end, that are logically incorporated into natural law. As beings, humans have an 
obligation to preserve that state of being, meaning there is an obligation to self-preservation. 
Humans also have animal inclinations, namely to reproduce, protect, and teach our offspring. 
As rational beings, humans have an “inclination toward knowing the truth about God and 
toward living in society” (ST I-II Q. 94 A. 2). Though numerous precepts seem unwieldy, 
Aquinas maintains that each of these inclinations are regulated by reason and therefore fall 
under the single precept of reason. Aquinas believes that the will is necessitated toward a 
single natural end: happiness. Unlike more modern ideologies, Aquinas does not believe that 
the happiness of the individual is competing with the happiness of the community (ST II-II Q. 
58 A. 5). They should, in theory, be in harmony, because “while a part, as such, belongs to a 
whole, so that whatever is the good of a part can be directed to the good of the whole” (ST II-II 
Q. 58 A. 5). The common good should be good for the individual and vice versa. Natural law 
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can then be thought of in terms of the individual or the community.
Conflict appears when natural law and human law overlap, as they will interact in one of 
two ways. In an ideal scenario the two will comply: the human law will affirm what is morally 
just and expressed in the natural law. Otherwise, the two can fail to comply. Aquinas maintains 
that natural law is superior to human law as it is humankind’s rational participation in God’s 
law, which is the highest and most absolute authority—it is difficult to imagine the rationale 
explaining how the arbitrary rule of humans could surpass the moral obligations we have 
derived from God’s law. Given this context, we can understand Aquinas’ statement: “If in 
any point [human law] deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion 
of law” (ST I-II Q. 95 A. 2). Aquinas does not intend to say that an unjust human law ceases 
to exist. Rather, he believes its authority is nullified. He writes, “Laws can be unjust . . . by 
being contrary to the divine good, as are tyrannical laws that induce men to idolatry or to 
do anything else that is contrary to divine law. It is not permissible to obey such laws in any 
way at all” (ST I-II Q. 96 A. 4). Natural law, as the human expression of eternal law, carries 
an analogous level of authority. One can logically infer that an unjust human law—one that 
violates natural law—is not only a law that it is morally permissible to ignore, but is a law that 
one is morally obligated to disobey.
Aquinas in the Twenty-First Century
 Let us return briefly to our established definition of modern civil disobedience, 
which states that civil disobedience is deliberate, nonviolent, and resistant toward a legally 
sanctioned injustice. This definition immediately resonates with conclusions drawn from 
Aquinas’ theory of law, as the proponents of both modern civil disobedience and Aquinas 
insist that an unjust law must not be obeyed. The arbitrary law of humans enforces this 
injustice, for both modes of thought, because choosing to disobey an unjust law necessarily 
puts the actor in direct conflict with the unjust law. Unfortunately, this does not clarify the 
situations in which civil disobedience should be applied or what the eventual goal of the 
action may be.
 Aquinas states that an unjust law is not a binding law (ST I-II Q. 96 A. 4). The 
straightforward path, then, is to ignore or actively disobey unjust laws. What is unjust? 
Aquinas again clarifies that an unjust law is one that violates natural law. But natural law, 
unlike human law, is not written or so easily accessible. To what extent should humans 
trust their own rational powers? A modern disobedient should be able to articulate why 
a law is unjust before they act in a contrary manner, if for no other purpose than for their 
own defense in social and legal spheres. To justify this imperative, Aquinas would likely 
turn to his notions of “synderesis” and conscience. Aquinas believes that “There must be 
some permanent principle which has unwavering integrity, in reference to which all human 
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works are examined, so that that permanent principle will resist all evil and assent to all 
good” (Questiones Disputatae de Veritate Q. 16 A. 2). This is the role filled by Aquinas’ notion 
of synderesis: it is the principle within us that is unfailingly inclined toward the good. The 
conscience, then, “is nothing but the application of knowledge [synderesis] to some special 
act” (QVD Q. 17 A. 2). Conscience can err in its application of synderesis, but synderesis itself 
does not err. 
Though conscience is sometimes faulty, Aquinas maintains that conscience is “certainly 
binding” and necessitates one toward the good in concrete instances; however, synderesis 
directs one toward the good in a more abstract, universal way (QVD Q. 17 A. 3). This binding 
conscience only extends so far as knowledge informs it. Aquinas makes a point of saying that 
conscience cannot bind someone to precepts of which they are ignorant (QVD Q. 17 A. 3). 
The best method seems to be to return to Aquinas’ inclinations; if a law violates any of these 
inclinations, it would appear that such a law contradicts natural law. Yet mistakes are not 
beyond us. This is another reason that civil disobedience should be public—if the disobedient 
is in fact violating a just law, the legal ramifications still apply. 
 A recent example of civil disobedience is the occupation of land by those protesting 
the Dakota Access Pipeline. The Standing Rock Sioux tribe—supported by other tribes, 
independent groups, and protestors—illegally occupied private land to halt the construction of 
a pipeline they claimed endangered environmental safety and violated their legal rights. The 
threat that a potential oil spill poses to the water supply in the area also threatens the health 
of individuals and the community. Many elements of modern civil disobedience and Aquinas 
as I have presented them are relevant here. The requirements for modern civil disobedience 
assumed in this essay seem entirely met: the protest was deliberate and nonviolent. Though 
the act of occupying land was not a strict contradiction to the injustice—for instance, if the 
unjust law was a permit allowing construction and the protestors had worked to deconstruct 
the pipeline during and after its construction—the occupation resisted the pursuit of the ends 
offered by the unjust law. The unjust legal allowance at Standing Rock does not mandate any 
kind of human action, but merely permits it. The protest does not seem to work counter the 
law itself, but rather against those who might take advantage of their new legal freedom to 
act unjustly. By Aquinas’ account, is it permissible not only to engage in civil disobedience, 
but also to interfere with injustices committed by others? I think that our practical precepts to 
preserve ourselves and live in a community would require us to resist unjust actions by others 
if they harm our individual persons or the good of the community. The violation of the Sioux 
people’s legal rights are undeniably important, but I think Aquinas would, based on natural 
law, support the civil disobedience for the sake of environmental rights. To compromise the 
water supply is to violate the precepts of law and reason. Physically endangering a community 
demands some form of resistance to the law that makes such a scenario possible, and it could 
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plausibly be argued that Aquinas would not condone a method as indirect as in the case at 
Standing Rock.
Another issue lies in an ideological conflict. Though Aquinas understood laws as 
benefiting both the community and the individual, our Western concept of liberalism may not 
always align the two. What if a law appears unjust to the individual but plausibly benefits 
the community? I imagine that Aquinas would have evaluated these on a case-by-case basis. 
Take for example a military draft. Is it moral to send individuals into a scenario where they 
may die if their country is benefiting from their potential sacrifice? Aquinas outlines three 
requirements for a “just” war. First, he requires that a sovereign gives authority to wage war. 
Second, those being attacked must be at fault in some way. Lastly, the war must be waged 
with pure aims, such as restoring peace or otherwise pursuing the good (ST II-II Q. 40 A. 1). 
If Aquinas’ conditions for just war are fulfilled, I imagine that Aquinas would support a draft 
and therefore would not consider the situation unjust or demanding of civil disobedience. 
This would align with his position maintaining that the individual acts as a part of the whole. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to find scenarios that are so clear-cut in history. The United States 
utilized the draft during the Vietnam War, but it is doubtful that Aquinas would have found 
the conflict as a whole to fulfill his conditions for just war. In this instance, I imagine that 
Aquinas would have condoned civil disobedience.
The Consequences of Action and Inaction
 The remaining question seems to be, to what end? What is the aim of civil disobedience, 
and what aim would Aquinas accept? Rawls includes in his definition that civil disobedience 
is “usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the 
government” (320). With our modern perspective of civil disobedience, this does seem right. 
But is a change in policy resulting from civil disobedience a mandatory end that one must 
seek? Aquinas would not require this outcome, but he does require that change is a likely 
consequence of the action. He explains that human law can change for two reasons: by reason 
or by humans. With reason, the law will “gradually move from what is imperfect toward what 
is perfect,” and humans are justified in changing the law as their social and cultural situations 
shift (ST I-II Q. 97 A. 1). However, Aquinas also posits that the common welfare is damaged 
by the changing of human laws, so “human law should never be changed unless the damage 
done to the common welfare by the change is wholly compensated for in some way” (ST I-II Q. 
97 A. 2).
Still, many accept the aim to make legal change as a part of the definition of civil 
disobedience. It does seem to follow that an unjust law should be changed so it can comply 
with natural law. However, if this end is accepted as a necessary condition, several additional 
points and questions must be considered. If legal change is the aim, it seems plausible that one 
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is morally obligated to go through every legal channel to change laws or policies. Would one 
be required to engage in civil disobedience while pursuing legal action? There is something 
odd about simultaneously adhering to the tedious legal system to change a law while 
disobeying another law enforced by the same system. If civil disobedience is done for the 
sake of adherence to natural law alone, the mere deliberate act of resistance would be enough. 
But if the aim is to change policy, more elements are required for success. Likely one would 
need many participants, high visibility, and support from figures with power. And if many 
aspects seem to fall short and the chance of successful policy change is slim, should the effort 
be abandoned? Presumably there is no scenario where one must either pursue both acts of 
resistance and policy change or neither. For this reason, I would argue that Aquinas would say 
no, the effort should not be abandoned. One must never comply with an unjust law, according 
to Aquinas (ST I-II Q. 96 A. 4). However, I believe Aquinas would urge that the disobedient 
abandon their attempt at policy change.
 Of course, no discussion of civil disobedience would be complete without considering 
the consequences. Plainly stated, civil disobedience is breaking the law. Though the term 
is frequently used to include protests and dissent, both actions are legal and therefore not 
encompassed by civil disobedience as defined above. People who do feel morally compelled 
to commit civil disobedience must also be willing to bear the consequences. Perhaps the most 
immediate concern is that a peaceful act of civil disobedience will be met with violence from 
authorities; this has been the case in several instances throughout history, including during the 
Children’s Crusade in Alabama in 1963 and at Standing Rock in North Dakota in 2016. There 
are also, of course, legal consequences. As Harold Pollack writes, “This [civil disobedience] 
isn’t something to be done lightly . . . What are the possible consequences of having a criminal 
record?” (“Thinking About Committing Civil Disobedience”). This consideration surely 
must have crossed Aquinas’ mind: individuals may have to sacrifice much in the name of 
civil disobedience. And beyond the individual the community must be considered, too. If 
a community is fragile and engages in civil disobedience to stand for rights they have been 
denied, what happens if most of the community is imprisoned? Here it almost seems that 
natural inclination for self-preservation would discourage community members from civil 
disobedience. To deliberately act in a way that endangers the community seems to contradict 
pursuit of the common good (ST I-II Q. 94 A. 2). But this would likely be an exceptional case, 
if it exists at all. Though there are many serious consequences of civil disobedience that every 
person must consider for themselves, generally speaking I believe Aquinas would have 
thought that the moral obligation outweighs the consequences, and that the act should be 
taken and the consequences accepted. Adherence to natural law is paramount (ST I-II Q. 94 A. 
2). Even if the consequences are not accepted, the disobedient act should be performed. The 
words of Martin Luther King Jr. offer what I imagine is a sentiment like one that might have 
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been expressed by Aquinas: “I submit that an individual who breaks a law that conscience tells 
him is unjust, and who willingly accepts the penalty of imprisonment in order to arouse the 
conscience of the community over its injustice, is in reality expressing the highest respect for 
law” (72).
A Historical Dilemma
 Civil disobedience clearly has many facets, and it seems that in actual situations 
these elements can conflict. The International Military Tribunal, held from 1945 to 1949 
in Nuremberg, Germany, tried individuals accused of war crimes during World War II. 
Interestingly, the more extreme formulation of Aquinas’ justification of civil disobedience was 
used by the prosecution: the accused may have been following orders, but they had a moral 
obligation to disobey unjust commands—that is, to engage in civil disobedience. The prosecution, 
problematically, asserted that these orders conflicted with international law; as Carl Cohen 
explains, “Many of the laws these persons were convicted of knowingly violating were not 
codified at the time the acts were perpetrated. In that sense the laws were ex post facto and 
unjustly applied” (199). This is an obvious legal problem, and for many it undermines the 
supposed justice served by the Tribunal. But would it be a problem for Aquinas? The argument 
of the prosecution would have likely suited Aquinas; Cohen summarizes it by saying, “Some 
things a man must not do, no matter who orders him to, or with what authority. And if he does 
do them he will be answerable, on this principle, not only to God or conscience but to courts 
of international law as well” (199). However, this fails to account for the consequences if one 
does not obey the corrupt order. Cohen himself responds to this, saying, “Taken as a moral 
justification only, the Nuremberg argument may ultimately prove his disobedience right—but 
it cannot protect him against the legal punishments his government or military superiors are 
likely to inflict upon him” (201).
 Would Aquinas care about this coercive element of the heinous acts committed under 
the order of superior authority? It is plausible that Aquinas would have felt a certain measure 
of sympathy for those who were purely coerced, but the elicited act of the will was still one 
of resistance. Yet I believe Aquinas would have agreed with the prosecution, even without 
the presence of international laws, that those who simply “followed orders” had a moral 
obligation to defy their orders. Aquinas maintains that obeying natural law is essential (ST 
I-II Q. 94 A. 2). He does not indicate any exceptions. In such a devastating event, it is perhaps 
more clear than any other time that natural law must be heeded regardless of the cost.
 Like many great philosophers, the thoughts of Aquinas are engaging; when invoked by 
a wordsmith such as Martin Luther King Jr., they are moving and inspiring. Civil disobedience 
and its call to obey a higher moral law have been the weapon of the people for centuries; yet 
civil disobedience hardly ever appears without creating philosophical or legal controversy. 
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In many instances, it is questionable whether Aquinas would support the action at all. The 
justification of civil disobedience requires a return to the foundation that Aquinas carefully 
laid to remind us of the assertions that lead us to the conditions of civil disobedience: that 
one disobeys an unjust law with intent, and does so peacefully and directly. Aquinas builds a 
theory of law deeply tied to moral reasoning; by trusting in the rational perception of eternal 
law, his theory asserts that it is morally required to disobey unjust human law.
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